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In the last twenty years, the topic of omissions and preventions has been given much discussion in the causation literature. David Lewis argued exclusively for their existence in one of his last published papers, while D.M. Armstrong and Helen Beebee have both strongly objected to his claims. Recently, Jonathan Schaffer has taken up the defense of omissions and preventions and has been engaged in a back and forth debate with Phil Dowe, their most prominent critic. While the topic is much too broad to discuss in its entirety, this paper attempts to develop a consistent defense of the existence of omissions and preventions against their usual criticisms by assuming the legitimacy of counterfactual causation and the ontological existence of normative claims. In so doing, I will show that such negative causation, when it involves a normative component in the description of the causal event, is a genuinely metaphysical relation between events that is worthy not only of conceptual, linguistic, and pragmatic acceptance, but of ontological acceptance as well. I will also show that such an account can guide our ascriptions of moral responsibility to agents in instances of potential omissions and preventions.
Most theories of causation fall into two somewhat opposing categories. One contains theories that analyze causation in terms of counterfactual dependence while the other contains singularist theories that hold causation to be an intrinsic relation between singular events.[1] Considering the later, singularist theories argue that causal relations among particulars lead to regularities and patterns but are not dependent on them. Two events C and E are necessarily related in virtue of their intrinsic properties and local factors. In other words, there is a physical connection between C and E. Given this physical connection, causal relations exist only between positive events and entities, that is, between factors that are empirically detectable.
On the contrary, the counterfactual theory of causation holds that particular causation occurs conditionally in virtue of causal regularities and patterns; causation is an extrinsic relation between events that depends on factors external to the related events themselves. As most famously advanced by Lewis, these causal relations can be analyzed and reduced to causal dependence, where causal dependence holds between two events C and E if and only if there is a chain of counterfactually dependent events linking C to E. In other words, “causal dependence holds between events if and only if the counterfactual ‘if C had not occurred, then E would not have occurred’ holds” (Armstrong 445). This counterfactual is true if and only if there is a possible world in which C does not occur and E does not occur and this world is closer in similarity to the actual world than any other possible world in which C does not occur but E does occur. Such similarity is largely due to the laws of nature (Lewis 279).[2]
Until fairly recently, such theories of causation have largely focused on giving an account of the relation between positive events, i.e., those events that actually occur. However, our causal language often includes talk of negative events, that is, “events whose essence is the absence of a property or particular” (Beebee 291). Omissions and preventions are examples of these. Preventions are “causes of what they prevent, ‘effects’ that never occur. Omissions are things that are not done but that have positive effects” (Armstrong 447). For example, my failure to rescue the drowning child in the pool before me could be said to have caused that child’s death. In this case, my omission brought about the drowning. However, suppose that I dove into the pool and pulled the child out and it did not die. Then my action can be said to have prevented the child’s death and that I caused the child to not die. In each case, the supposed causal interaction involves a negative event, one that does not actually occur. The singularist must reject the intuition that actual causation occurs in this situation. On the other hand, the counterfactualist tends to allow that such absence or negative causation does occur and that negative events are ontologically legitimate.
However, such an affirmation faces many problems. First the singularist argues that negative events do not in fact exist and so they cannot figure into causal relations about the actual world. As Lewis writes, “a relation requires relata” (Lewis 281). Without ontological relata, a causal relation cannot be ontologically acceptable. The proposed relation may be pragmatically, conceptually, or linguistically useful, but it will not give an account of what actually occurs in the real world since it will not actually exist.
Second, even supposing that negative events exist, there is no causal chain linking the positive and negative events together. For example, suppose that, through a father’s negligence, a child is hit by a car after running into the street. Dowe points out, “it may not be true that had the father not done those actual positive things he did the accident would not have occurred since there are other ways that the father could have failed to prevent the accident” (Dowe, “A Counterfactual” 220). Thus, it might be the case that counterfactual dependence does not exist between an omission and its cause or a prevention and its effect, and without this dependence, causation does not occur.
Third, one might ask where these preventions and omissions occur. In his criticism, Dowe gives three possibilities: there, here, or everywhere. To be located “there” is for an absence to be “located at the location of the actually occurring alternative to the absent event” (Dowe, “Absences” 12). For example, this is where the father is when his child is hit by the car. Dowe objects that this cannot be the right location since the father is separated in space from the accident, which violates the assumed fact that causation at a distance does not occur. To be located “here” is for an absence to be located where the absence would have occurred. For example, this is where the father would have grabbed his child and thus prevented him from being hit. But, Dowe objects, this is also separated in space from the accident. Finally, to be located “everywhere” is to be “not located at all” and thus a violation of the claim that causes and effects must be located (Dowe, “Absences” 16). Since prevention and omissions are neither here, there, nor everywhere, Dowe concludes that they do not exist.
A fourth charge is that if omissions and preventions are causes then the actual amount of omissions and preventions is far greater than our intuitions will allow. Dowe points out that Kennedy’s bodyguard, you, me, and Julius Caesar all could have pushed the gun away if we had been on hand, so we are all the cause of Kennedy’s death, “and so too for every event that has ever occurred that could have been prevented by human intervention” (Dowe, “The Power” 7). If Dowe is right, then there are too many omissions and preventions to count as causes and therefore the view that they are causes is absurd.
Fifth, supposing that omissions and preventions are legitimate causes, can the counterfactualist maintain a moral distinction between, say, killing and letting die? If there is a moral distinction between some direct causes and some indirect or absent causes as if often thought, then the counterfactualist must be able to explain what that difference is and why it makes a moral difference. If she cannot, then a singularist will have the advantage in explaining this moral intuition.
Several distinctions need to be made that have been largely neglected in the discussion of this topic. The first is the distinction between what “causation” means as it is commonly used and what it ought to mean. The former focuses on usage and as such is a semantic claim about the word “causation.” In this, the counterfactualist meaning clearly matches our usage much better than the singularist meaning because it allows for absence causation (see Schaffer “Causes need”). Singularists may charge that this is not what “causation” ought to mean because it does not match the metaphysical reality of causation, but that is a separate question from what it means in practice. It is important to not conflate these two distinctions.
Second, one needs to distinguish between “a cause” and “the cause.” Almost nothing can claim to be the cause of any event. Instead, most events have several causes that together cause them. When we single out a cause as being the cause, it is often done for practical purposes that serve human needs and interests. However, we want to give an account of causation that is not merely pragmatic but objectively true; we want an ontological analysis of causation. Thus, it may be appropriate to speak of a cause as being the primary cause of an event if the majority of that event’s causes can be traced back to this cause, but it will still be considered a cause, one of many causes, of the event.[3]
Third, one needs to distinguish between negative causation by agents and negative causation by events. We should not presuppose that an example of agent causation can be translated into a generalized formulation of event causation. Within negative causation by agents, one also needs to distinguish between different kinds of normative agents and which normative claims relevantly apply to them. For example, my oven thermometer may fail to register the correct temperature and thereby cause my turkey to be burned, but I would not hold it morally responsible for that result. That is, I would not ascribe to it the property of moral blameworthiness for its failure to function as it ought to.
Fourth, one should note that causal responsibility is distinct from normative responsibility. It does seem to be always true that if A is (morally) responsible for B, then A caused (or was a cause) of B. We only hold people morally responsible for an ensuing event if they were somehow a cause of it and it does not make sense to hold someone responsible for an event for which they were not a cause. However, it is clear that it is not always true that if A caused (or was a cause of) B, then A is (morally) responsible for B (e.g., my breathing may have been a necessary condition for the occurrence of a tornado, but usually I am not morally responsible for the damage it causes). But the conditional is not always false either. Why, then, do we hold others morally responsible in some cases but not in others when in both cases they are a cause of the ensuing event? That is, why does an agent acquire the property of being morally blameworthy and why is her action singled out among the many causes of an event in some instances but not in others? Since neither intention nor primary causality is necessary for moral responsibility, it seems that causality is turned into responsibility by the violation of a norm; what is caused is normatively significant and hence its initiator acquires a normative property. Thus, we can say that an agent A is responsible for B if A is a cause of B and A violates a norm related to B’s occurrence.
However, while this is easily applied to agents, it is more difficult to apply it to events in general and omissions and preventions in particular. One can immediately object that events are not “responsible” for other events and that causation, like these events, is not normative. This is the position that Helen Beebee takes. Beebee says that a normative analysis of causation “doesn't look like the sort of analysis we ought to be giving of the metaphysics of causation by absence” (Beebee 296). She goes on to assert that “nobody within the tradition of the metaphysics of causation that I'm concerned with here thinks that causal facts depend on human dependent norms,” and that adding normativity “would in any case make the truth of causal claims turn out to be a relative matter” (Beebee 297). In other words, Beebee believes that causation is an objective metaphysical relation that is not dependent on human subjectivity. In order to maintain this objectivity, we cannot admit relative normative claims into our analysis.
However, it seems possible to maintain the objectivity of causation even if we permit moral claims and other normative notions into our analysis. If normative claims are not relative or dependent on humans but instead are true in virtue of ontologically real normative properties or statistical regularities in the world, then these claims can factor into an objective analysis of causation. Indeed, the counterfactual analysis of causation is based on Hume’s regularity analysis. Or, if one does not want to make causation an intrinsically normative relation, one can locate the normative component in the events that are related and thereby maintain the objective status of causation. Thus, the counterfactual analysis of causation can easily accommodate a normative component in an acceptable way.
Beebee brings up another related objection. She claims that “how often something has to happen in order to count as ‘normal’- and hence for its absence to count as abnormal - is always going to be rather fluid” (Beebee 297). She is concerned that there is no genuine unity to our concept of “normal.” McGrath counters this worry by noticing that we speak of something as normal by referencing an appropriate objective standard (McGrath 138). For example, with promises, we appeal to a moral standard; with alarm clocks, a design or artifactual standard; with hearts, a design or biological standard; with rain, a weather-cycle standard based on statistical regularities and laws of nature (McGrath 138). These standards are different for each domain and pose different requirements for what counts as normal. However, common to each example is a measurement of how well it matches the standard in its domain, and this commonality gives unity to the notion of “normal.” Given the foregoing reasons, it seems possible to have an objective notion of “normal” and hence, normative claims can play a role in causal claims.
At this point, we can consider the first objection: negative events do not in fact exist and so they cannot figure into causal relations about the actual world. Schaffer offers a solution, as suggested by Lewis, that we can “regard the absence description as a way of referring to a present event” (Schaffer, “Causes need” 212). For example, the father’s failure to prevent his child from running into the road is a way of describing what the father actually did (e.g., take a nap, read a book). Similarly, supposing that the father did restrain the child and thereby caused the accident to not occur, the event of the accident’s non-occurrence refers to the positive event of whatever the child did (e.g., sit down, stay on the lawn). However, this leads to our second objection that there is no causal link between the negative event and the positive event. For instance, suppose that the father took a nap and the child ran into the street and was hit. It is not necessarily true that, if the father had not taken a nap, then the child would not have been hit. The father could have read a book or watched TV instead of napping. Thus, there is no causal dependence between the referred-to positive event and its supposed effect.
We need a way to turn the positive event “the father’s taking a nap” and the negative event “the father’s not being watchful” into one positive event that gives counterfactual dependence. The solution is to include the normative component of the negative event into the positive event or to give a positive event that is normative. For instance, the event “the father’s taking a nap” is not an ordinary nap-taking. In context, this event violates a moral norm since it is a negligent nap-taking. It would be better to describe the event as “the father’s taking a nap and not being a watchful father.” Thus, “the father’s taking a nap and not being a watchful father” caused the accident because, if the father had not been taking a nap or had been a watchful father, then the accident would not have occurred. We might also characterize the event as an instance of negligence in which the father’s taking a nap is a description of that instance.[4] In other words, the true event is not the father’s taking a nap, but the father’s being negligent. Instead, the nap describes how he was negligent. Thus, the father’s negligence caused the accident because, if the father had not been negligent, then the accident would not have occurred. This is true in the most similar possible world to the actual world, and so there is causal dependence and hence causation.[5]
If normative claims and normative properties are ontologically real, then this event is a real event. To say that a father is “watchful” or “negligent” is to attribute real moral properties to him and to say that he fulfills or does not fulfill his real moral obligations. In addition, the father did take a nap, so this event is positive in nature; it really exists. The actually occurring event provides the positive relata and the normative component or property of the event provides the counterfactual dependence. Together, they secure a genuine causal relation between these two events. This causal relation is ontologically real and not merely linguistic, pragmatic, or conceptual.
If the foregoing is correct, we can easily address the other problems lodged against this position. First, one can appeal to the normative component or property of an event to limit the number of omissions and preventions. Even Lewis subtly appeals to this when he claims that someone cast into the void dies because “he would […] have been surrounded by the life-sustaining objects that normally surround us” (Lewis 282). Normative claims can pick out which agents and events have a normative relationship to the ensuing event. For instance, it is not my nap, nor your nap, nor anybody else’s nap the causes the child to be hit by a car. It is the father’s nap and his lack of positive moral properties in addition to his moral obligation to his child that makes the father a cause of the accident. I may have napped, and I may not have good moral character, but since I do not stand in a relevant normative relation to this child, I am not a cause of the accident.
Second, we can say that the omission occurred where the referred-to positive event occurred (e.g., wherever the father is taking a nap when the accident happens), since it is this event that stands in a causal relation to the effect. Similarly, a prevention occurs at the positive point of prevention (e.g., where the father grabs the child to prevent it from running into the road). Dowe will object that in both cases, the cause is separated in space from its effect. But this only poses a problem if causes are physically connected to their effects (as Dowe assumes). The counterfactual theory of causation does not require a cause and effect to be physically connected, but only that a chain of counterfactual dependence exists between them. Since this criterion is met, causation at a distance is legitimate.
Third, the counterfactualist can make a distinction between positive and negative causation that is morally relevant by referencing the normative component of the events involved. For example, suppose it is true that “one should never kill an innocent person.” Then the event “the physician’s administration of a lethal dose” caused the event “the patient died.” The moral norm can be added to the first event, and though it does not make any causal difference, it makes a difference with respect to responsibility. In this case, the physician is morally responsible for the patient’s death. However, the event “the physician pulled the plug” caused the event “the patient died” only if there is a moral norm against pulling the plug. Assuming there isn’t, then this is not a genuine case of causation, that is, the pulling of the plug did not cause the patient to die. Instead, the ailment that the patient was suffering from caused the patient to die. But if there was a moral norm against pulling plugs or against letting people die, then this would count as genuine causation. We could say that the event “the physician’s pulling the plug and his not being a moral practitioner” caused the event “the patient died” because if the physician had not pulled the plug or had been a moral practitioner, then the patient would not have died. We could also go on to say that the physician was morally responsible for the patient’s death since his pulling the plug violated a moral norm and caused the patient’s death.
In his conclusion, Lewis asks: “What is causation? As a matter of analytic necessity, across all possible worlds, what is the unified necessary and sufficient condition for causation? - It is somehow a matter of counterfactual dependence of events (or absences) on other events (or absences)” (Lewis 287). This paper has attempted to defend this position specifically in instances of absences. It has been argued that if normative claims are true in virtue of ontologically real normative properties or statistical regularities in the world, then these claims can factor into an objective analysis of causation. On such an analysis for omissions and preventions, one can combine the normative component of a negative event with its positive referring event to create a positive event that is normative. This normative and positive event can then figure into causal dependence and hence causation itself. Thus, omissions and preventions are, properly construed, examples of genuine causation.
Works Cited and Consulted
Armstrong, David. “Going Through the Open Door Again.” Causation and Counterfactuals. Ed.
John Collins, Edward Hall, and Laurie Paul. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. 445-58. Print.
Beebee, Helen. “Causing and Nothingness.” Causation and Counterfactuals. Ed. John Collins,
Edward Hall, and Laurie Paul. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. 291-308. Print.
Dowe, Phil. “Absences, Possible Causation, and the Problem of Non-locality.” Phil Dowe:
Selected Work on Causation. N.p., Jan. 2009. 1-23. Web. 1 Oct. 2010. <http://homepage.
mac.com/pdowe/Research/cause.html>.
---. “Causes are Physically Connected to their Effects: Why Preventers and Omissions
are not Causes.” Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Ed.
Christopher Hitchcock. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004: 189-96. Print.
---. “A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and ‘Causation’ by Omission.” Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 79.2 (2001): 216-26. Philosopher’s Index. Web. 1 Oct. 2010.
---. “The Power of Possible Causation.” Phil Dowe: Selected Work on Causation. N.p.,
Jan. 2009. 1-22. Web. 1 Oct. 2010. <http://homepage.mac.com/pdowe/Research/
cause.html>.
Lewis, David. “Void and Object.” Causation and Counterfactuals. Ed. John Collins, Edward
Hall, and Laurie Paul. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. 277-90. Print.
Lowe, E.J. A Survey of Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Print.
McGrath, Sarah. “Causation by Omission: A Dilemma.” Philosophical Studies 123 (2005): 125-
48. Philosopher’s Index. Web. 1 Oct. 2010.
Schaffer, Jonathan. “Causation by Disconnection.” Philosophy of Science 67 (2000): 285-300.
Philosopher’s Index. Web. 1 Oct. 2010.
---. “Causes need not be Physically Connected to their Effects: The Case for
Negative Causation.” Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Ed. Christopher
Hitchcock. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004: 197-216. Print.
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[1] For the purposes of this paper, I will ignore probabilistic theories and I will be assuming a largely deterministic universe, although my argument seems to be neutral between determinism and indeterminism.
[2] Lewis ultimately rejected this specific formulation in favor of his influence account of causation. However, my argument does not depend on the specific details of a counterfactual account of causation, but only on the general framework that is common to all such accounts. That is, that causation is a matter of counterfactual dependence between events.
[3] This point may be contested as some may insist that there is always a “the cause” of an event. However, my argument does not seem to require taking a side on this issue. Rather, the point is made in order to be clearer about the terms being used in the debate.
[4] Thanks to Andrew Morgan for offering this point.
[5] This account can avail itself to the same modifications and strategies that all counterfactual theories of causation use to avoid cases of preemption and other similar issues. However, this is a side issue to the main point of this paper, which assumes the legitimacy of counterfactual theories of causation in general.
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