Aristotelian Naturalism and Post-Darwinian Biology (1)

I wrote this paper for a class on Ethical Theory while completing my MA in Philosophy.  This was submitted on December 7, 2011 and remains as I submitted it (apart from formatting changes).
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Introduction

Aristotelian Naturalism is a form of ethical naturalism, which is broadly “the enterprise of basing ethics in some way on considerations of human nature” (Hursthouse 192).  Or as Kitcher puts it, it is an “endeavor to explain the meaning of central moral terms by drawing on biological insights” (Kitcher, “Biology” 164). As such, Aristotelian Naturalism is an attempt to ground ethical norms in that way that human beings naturally are, and thus, to give an account of morality that is completely natural and objective.[1]  However, such a view faces difficulties if it is at odds with contemporary biology, and as Kitcher claims, “there is an established orthodoxy among leading biologists and philosophers of biology that would dismiss any grounding of value in ‘human nature’ as unpromising” (Kitcher, “Essence” 61).  Is Aristotelian Naturalism at odds with post-Darwinian biology?  I will argue that it is not.  In this paper I will explain what Aristotelian Naturalism is and what it is committed to.  I will address objections to the view that are based on biological considerations largely derived from evolutionary views of nature.  I find that each of these objections fails, either because it either mischaracterizes the view or because a simple modification can be made to avoid the objection.  Thus, I conclude that Aristotelian Naturalism is an extremely powerful, plausible, and persuasive metaethical view.

Summary of View

What is Aristotelian Naturalism in its contemporary form?[2]  The basic idea is that we can assign value to an individual of a certain species by looking at what is “normal” or “characteristic” with regards to the species as a whole.  As Foot claims, whether an individual has natural goodness “depends directly on the relation of an individual to the ‘life form’ of its species” (Foot 26-7).  Thus, we must assess individuals according to the “nature of the species to which the individual belongs,” and it is this nature that determines how individuals should be (Foot 27, 32).  Consequently, an evaluation of “goodness” or “badness” is akin to other types of natural evaluation and not anything especially different.[3] 

For example, Hursthouse claims that we can and do evaluate plants as being good or bad specimens with respect to their species according to their (i) parts and (ii) their operations and whether these are good or bad themselves (Hursthouse 198).  What makes a plant’s parts and operations either good or bad depends on “whether they are contributing, in the way characteristic of such a member of such a species, to (1) individual survival through the characteristic life span of such a member of such a species and (2) continuance of the species” (Hursthouse 198).[4]  Thus, there are two aspects of plants that are naturally oriented towards two ends.  If an individual plant has parts and operations that are not characteristically contributing to individual and species survival, then it is a defective or bad plant.

It is important to note that such evaluations are made in the context of an environment.  The appropriate context of assessment for what counts as an “excellence” or “defect” in an individual member of a species is the “natural habitat of the species” (Foot 34).  Given that plants, animals, and humans have evolved within specific environments of the natural world, it only makes sense to assess them with these specific environments in mind.  It would be wrong to claim that monkeys are defective since they cannot breathe underwater, for monkeys do not actually live under water.  Living things must be critically assessed according to the environments in which they actually live and have adapted for.  Based on these natural facts about individuals and their species as well as facts about the environments that these species live in, we can evaluate individuals according to whether they are living well as members of a species as situated in that species’ natural environment.[5]

When we turn to animals, they are evaluated according to a third aspect: (iii) whether they act well (in the way characteristic of their species) (Hursthouse 199).  This is done with respect to (1) and (2) as well as to a third end (3): “characteristic freedom from pain and characteristic pleasure or enjoyment” (Hursthouse 199).[6]  This is especially true for animals with more advanced cognitive capacities, which leads to a fourth aspect: (iv) emotions and desires.  Higher level animals not only experience pain and pleasure but have emotions and desires, and these are oriented towards a fourth end: (4) “the good functioning of the social group” (Hursthouse 201).   A social group is functioning well when it effectively enables its members to live well in the characteristic way of the species, that is, by supporting individual survival, individual freedom from pain enjoyment of pleasure, and individual development of capacities (Hursthouse 201-2).

When we come to humans, there is no sudden change in how to evaluate them.  It is very natural to assume that “the criteria of goodness in human beings must be related to what human beings are and/or do, as such,”[7] and so they are evaluated in the same way that plants and animals are evaluated (Hursthouse 206).  Humans are taken to be part of the natural order of the world, and hence, can be evaluated according to their natural properties.  As Hursthouse points out, “what human beings are is a species of rational, social animals and thereby a species of living things – which… have a particular biological make-up and a natural life cycle” (Hursthouse 206).[8]  However, humans are distinct from other higher-level animals in that, given our higher-level cognitive capacities, we are primarily[9] moved to act from reason instead of being determined by unreflective inclination or nature; our rationality has a “genuinely transforming effect” on our basic biological structure that creates a “huge gap” between us and other animals (Hursthouse 218-20).[10]  Since our rationality leads humans to live in a variety of seemingly different ways,[11] and since we can even reflect on and question our nature,[12] the only characteristic and unquestionable[13] way of living that humans have in common is a ‘rational way,’ where a ‘rational way,’ is defined as “any way that we can rightly see as good, as something we have reason to do” (Hursthouse 222).   

What do we have reason to do?  Hursthouse hints that reason is primarily oriented towards helping us attain our “characteristic enjoyments,” which are “any enjoyments we can rightly see as good, as something we in fact enjoy and that reason can rightly endorse” (Hursthouse 222).  Foot similarly claims that humans aim at ‘happiness,’ where ‘happiness’ is to be taken as “the enjoyment of good things, meaning enjoyment in attaining, and in pursuing, right ends” (Foot 97).  The right ends are exactly those ends which characteristically belong to the human species, and so to act in accordance with reason is to attain and find enjoyment in those ends (e.g., basic needs, social relationships).  Thus, to act morally or well is to act in accordance with what reason endorses and to act immorally or badly is to act contrary to practical reason; “moral action is rational action” (Foot 24).  Foot even goes so far as to say that “moral action is a requirement of practical rationality” (Foot 21).  Similarly, we evaluate a person as morally good or bad with respect to whether her rational will is oriented towards what is naturally good for her (Foot 66).  In other words, it is our acting from reason “that makes us good or bad human beings in the ethical sense” (Hursthouse 207).          

Since acting from reason is to act in accordance with our characteristic enjoyments, which depend on our nature, “it is still the case that human beings are ethically good in so far as their ethically relevant aspects foster the four ends appropriate to a social animal, in the way characteristic of the species” (Hursthouse 224).  For virtue ethicists, these ethically relevant aspects are the virtues, and so we can say that “the virtues make their possessor a good human being” since “human beings need the virtues in order to live well, to flourish as human beings, to live a characteristically good, eudaimon, human life” (Hursthouse 167).  In sum, as Hursthouse writes:

The truth of ‘this action is right’ is dependent on the truth of ‘This is what a virtuous         agent would characteristically do in the circumstances’; the truth of that is dependent    upon (i) what an agent with a certain character trait would do in the circumstances and (ii) whether that character trait is a virtue.  The truth of (ii), whether the character trait in question is a virtue, depends on whether the character trait conduces to the four    naturalistic ends (in a rational way) and the truth of that depends in part on human interests and desires. (Hursthouse 239)

Right action is action that conduces to our human nature, which leads to our flourishing as human beings.

Consequently, the answer to the question “why be moral?” is that acting morally benefits the actor based on her nature as a human being, and so acting morally is the only rational thing to do (Hursthouse 251).  However, it is important to point out, as Hursthouse does, that having the virtues does not guarantee that one will always flourish or that they are necessary for flourishing (Hursthouse 172-3).  Many virtuous people have met with tragedy in spite of and even because of their virtue.  But exceptions to a “rule” do not disprove it so long as there is a general pattern upon which the rule is based.[14]  Most people will agree that “if we act well, things go well for us.  When it does not, when eudaimonia is impossible to achieve or maintain, that’s not ‘what we should have expected’ but tragically bad luck” (Hursthouse 185).  Thus, the claim that “the virtues benefit their possessor” should be taken as meaning that living a virtuous life is the “only reliable bet” for living a flourishing life and that “that no ‘regimen’ [for how one should live one’s life] will serve one better” (Hursthouse 172-3).  That is, if we want to live well, our best bet is to live according to the virtues.  And this is a good bet since such a life is rooted in our nature as human beings and so we are simply living in accordance with the type of beings that we are.

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Aristotelian Naturalism and Post-Darwinian Biology (2)

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Objections 

Now that the Aristotelian Naturalist view has been sufficiently explained, we can consider some objections that stem from the perception that it is incompatible with post-Darwinian biology.  The first objection denies that human beings have any stable nature.  Hursthouse quotes Bernard Williams as claiming that “human beings are to some degree a mess, and […] the rapid and immense development of symbolic and cultural capacities has left humans as beings for whom no form of life is likely to prove entirely satisfactory, either individually or socially” (Hursthouse 261).  Hursthouse’s interpretation of what this implies is that “we are beings for whom no form of life is likely to prove satisfactory at all.  Any individuals who flourish individually and socially are an extraordinary accident” (Hursthouse 261).  Given that we have no stable nature, there is no form of how best to live a human life and hence nothing natural about human beings that can ground any ethical claims.  As such, we are left with moral nihilism and despair regarding how to live our lives since flourishing is simply a matter of luck.

Another way of putting this objection is to deny that there is any essence that humans, as a species, have.  Kitcher believes that contemporary biology undermines any attempt to give necessary and sufficient conditions for species membership and so we cannot clearly define what it means to be a member of the human species, let alone determine which individuals are members (Kitcher, “Biology” 165).  Consequently, biological norms are impossible to specify.  For example, many ‘normal’ genotypes found in human beings may be excluded if we define the properties constitutive of the human essence too narrowly, while if it is set too low many genotypes that are associated with disease will be included (Kitcher, “Essence” 66).  Similarly, making rationality an essential feature of human nature excludes many beings that we generally take to be human (e.g., infants, the mentally disabled) and includes many animals that are not human beings (e.g., primates).  Without an essence or a form to guide our assessments of individuals with respect to the species, we cannot say what individuals should be like, only what they are like.

The second objection is that the Aristotelian view of nature is teleological while post-Darwinian biology has discarded any teleological notions, and so any teleological claims rest on a human imposition of value upon nature.  Hursthouse quotes Bernard Williams as claiming that, “the first and hardest lesson of Darwinism [is] that there is no such teleology at all” (Hursthouse 257).  Since humans have evolved and since evolution is a random and aimless process, humans are also aimless in their desires, interests, and goals.  As such, Kitcher accuses Aristotelian Naturalists like Foot of adopting a “pre-Darwinian conception of function that either offers no way of connecting her moral conclusions to biological facts or else does so only because the conception already tacitly presupposes certain moral ends and values” (Kitcher, “Biology” 165).  The link between biology and morality rests on an imposition of value that links biological features with our values because we have placed special importance on these features (e.g., rationality).  Thus, Kitcher concludes that “the effort to use our species essence to identify the human good… fails, because ideas about the good have to be imported” into our biological claims (Kitcher, “Essence 68).

Similarly, Kitcher believes we cannot objectively determine a ‘normal’ environment.  Kitcher rightly points out that “virtually all human characteristics – including all those that are of interest in identifying the human good – result from an interaction between genotype and environment” (Kitcher, “Essence 67).  Thus, there are no purely intrinsic features that can make up the essence of human nature since any such properties “can be expressed in very different ways given the right – or the wrong – environments” (Kitcher, “Essence 67).  So far, the Aristotelian Naturalist is in agreement.  However, Kitcher goes on to claim that “we select environments as normal in virtue of the fact that they permit genotypes to issue in the traits we value” (Kitcher, “Essence 67).  For example, we value our cognitive capacities and so the ‘normal’ environment for humans is one that fosters these capacities.  But this is an illegitimate imposition of our value onto nature and so any ethical claims based on this imposition are not purely objective or natural.  As Kitcher concludes, “the selection of the explananda already involves just those judgments of value which were supposed to be recovered from the identification of the human essence, and we have no independent route to the essence that will avoid prior judgment about what is valuable” (Kitcher, “Essence 75).

Third, Kitcher argues that evolutionary theory is more compatible with an expressivist meaning of ethical terms.  He proposes the following evolutionary story of how biological altruism[15] and psychological altruism[16] arose.  Organisms are primarily driven to pass along their DNA to future generations.  Supposing that an organism cannot or is unlikely to pass along its own DNA, it makes sense for that organism to act altruistically towards a close relative.  That close relative will share much of the same DNA, and so if one’s relative is reproductively successful, one is also in a sense successful in passing one’s DNA along (Kitcher, “Biology” 167).  Similarly, organisms can act with reciprocity such that “if one acts today to incur a small reproductive loss that provides a large reproductive gain for the beneficiary, and if the favor is returned tomorrow, then both gain” (Kitcher, “Biology” 167).  Thus, reciprocity can, over the long term, help all parties to pass along their DNA to future generations.

Since evolution selects traits that enable individuals to survive in the current environment, and since biological altruism is advantageous to everyone overall, it will be selected.  Overtime, biological altruism will lead to psychological altruism to further promote survival by fostering social cohesion.  Along with psychological altruism comes an evolved capacity for normative guidance: a “capacity for articulating rules and using those rules to shape our wishes, plans, and intentions, so that the frequency with which the altruistic tendencies that underlie cooperation are overridden is diminished” (Kitcher, “Biology” 172).  Such a capacity is adaptively advantageous since hominids that have this capacity will “earn a reputation as good coalition-mates, and this secures them access to advantageous coalitions (and to the sub-coalitions that influence the distribution of resources” (Kitcher, “Biology” 172).  In addition, this capacity will further promote social cohesion, leading to an increase in the numbers of individuals within a society.  These small societies will be governed by shared rules that shape member attitudes (Kitcher, “Biology” 172-3).  As these societies grow larger, new sources of conflict will arise and so by relying on our capacity for norm governance, these societies will modify their “traditional norms” to resolve these conflicts (Kitcher, “Biology” 173). 

If such a story is correct, then it seems that such moral norms are merely pragmatic rules that function to coordinate human social behavior (Kitcher, “Biology” 175).  By learning them, one does not learn something objective about the world, but only that a certain rule is used by a certain society to maintain social order.  Thus, Kitcher claims that moral norms are rooted in our attitudes towards the world as shaped by our evolved cultural upbringing, and not in anything natural or objective about human nature.

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Aristotelian Naturalism and Post-Darwinian Biology (3)

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Responses to Objections

How might the Aristotelian Naturalist respond to these objections?  The first objection is that human beings are a “mess” and hence have no stable human nature that could ground ethical claims. To respond, first, we can deny the claim that there is no stable human nature.  While humans do vary in their pursuits, goals, and desires to a large degree, this variation is constrained and united by other traits.  One unifying trait, for example, is our capacity to guide our action by practical reasons.  Thus, our receptivity to reasons is a stable feature of our nature.  Other characteristics about humans are also fairly stable. For example, humans have basic needs in common (e.g., food, shelter,  and clothing) and a desire for meaningful relationships (e.g., friendship, family). 

Second, Williams is overly pessimistic.  Flourishing is not simply a matter of luck, but a matter of correctly using our practical reasoning.  While it is true that even those who have been trained by virtue will occasionally meet failure due to luck,  “characteristically,” people have terrible lives and experiences because “either they, and/or their fellow and adjacent human beings, are defective in their possession and exercise of the virtues on the standard list” (Hursthouse 264).  We can see this by tracing out the chain of causes leading up to a terrible situation in someone’s life and it usually depends on choices made by individuals who failed to act in accordance with virtuous character traits.

Third, if Williams is right, then all we are left is moral nihilism.  Ethical practice assumes that humans can harmonize their interests, desires, and pursuits both internally and externally, and unless we want to lapse into moral skepticism, we must make this assumption.  And we have good reason to, for we can see that human beings are not just a “mess.”  As Hursthouse points out, humans can and do, “through the correct moral education in their youth and then reflective, rational, self-modification, achieve a harmony that [enables] us to live well, individually and socially” (Hursthouse 263).  Thus, Williams’ contention that human beings are a “mess” for whom no way of life will reliably lead to flourishing is pessimistic at best and simply false at worst.

Responding now to Kitcher’s related concern that there is no essence that unites all humans, the Aristotelian Naturalist can reject classical essentialist views of natural kinds for more contemporary accounts.  One such account is the Homeostatic Property Cluster (HPC) view.  The HPC view claims that natural kinds like species track mechanisms/causal processes that sustain property clusters in a stable way.  The properties in a cluster are those that we typically identify with a natural kind (e.g., rationality is a typical property that humans have).  As such, one can use homeostatic mechanisms to individuate kinds; the natural kind is delineated by the homeostatic mechanism(s) that sustain(s) it and so the homeostatic mechanisms “determine the boundary and integrity of the kind” (Brigandt 9).  Mechanisms can operate on both relational (external) and intrinsic (internal) properties and so whether an individual is part of a natural kind partly depends on features external to that individual (Boyd 153, Brigandt 5). [17] 

On this view, we can and should expect some variety in the properties of the members of a kind since the members will be interacting with other mechanisms that do not define their kind (e.g., environmental background conditions).  Other varieties can be explained by the fact that mechanisms may sustain clusters of properties and not any single property (e.g., maleness and femaleness is sustained by interbreeding).  But this is permissible since kinds are individuated by mechanisms and not by properties.  As such, this view can account for the intrinsic heterogeneity that is common in biological kinds that “subsume individual entities (e.g., organisms) whose variation from one another is a natural part of what it is to be a member of those kinds” (Wilson 6).  When the variation becomes too great, we can attribute this to the breakdown of mechanisms that have sustained a kind, leading to speciation as a result of the new mechanisms that form and operate on existing individuals (Rieppel 41).  Thus, we can say that when the causal processes with which a species is identified no longer operate, then that species no longer exists. 

Furthermore, we can capture the essentialist intuition by saying that members of a natural kind all have the ‘property’ of having participated in the same causal processes.  Participating in the causal processes definitive of the natural kind is a necessary and sufficient condition for one’s being a member of that kind.  The “scope” of the kind extends as far as the mechanisms that sustain the property clusters in a kind operate (Magnus 7).  Since the causal processes universally operate on members of a kind, are responsible for the kind’s typical traits, and explain why the kind has these traits, the causal processes form the essence of the kind.  Therefore, contrary to Kitcher’s claim, we can specify an essence that unites all humans.

The second objection is that post-Darwinian biology is not teleological while Aristotelian Naturalism requires the attribution of purpose and goals to biological entities.  First, we should note that Aristotelian Naturalism makes claims about species only “at a given historical time” (Foot 29).  While it is true that what would be good for humans would not necessarily be good for our distant ancestors, we need only focus on humans as they are (and have been) as a stable species.  Recalling the HPC view of natural kinds, there is a cluster of properties of which all human beings have a subset, and we can make claims about human nature based on these stable features.

Second, notice that the Aristotelian Naturalist view is at the very least not incompatible with a Darwinian view.  It is simply looking at organisms in a different way for a different purpose (that is, for an ethical purpose).  Aristotelian Naturalism modestly claims that moral claims are grounded in facts about humans, including biological facts.  However, biology is largely descriptive.  Aristotelian Naturalism does not describe humans in any way contradictory to biology, but merely uses the descriptive biological features of humans to formulate prescriptions for behavior and character.  As Foot asserts, “a moral evaluation does not stand over against the statement of a matter of fact, but rather has to do with facts about a particular subject matter, as do evaluations of such things as sight and hearing in animals, and other aspects of their behavior” (Foot 24).  Thus, Aristotelian Naturalism draws on the characteristic features of humans that we have learned from biology and other sciences and forms norms for behavior that are explained and supported by natural facts about humans (Foot 36).

One such characteristic of the human species is that it is rational; it is a fact that “human beings are creatures with the power to recognize reasons for action and to act on them” (Foot 24).  A human that recognizes a reason for acting is given a goal, purpose, or end by that reason (Foot 23).  When that reason is grounded in human nature and other natural facts, then such a goal, purpose, or end is also natural.  Perhaps biologists have completely discarded the idea that our use of reason actually determines us to do anything if biological determinism is really at work, but this is at the very least a controversial move.  And even if our use of reason does not, in the end, actually lead us to do anything we were not already biologically determined to do, this does not mean that there are no reasons for acting in certain ways.  For example, whether or not I recognize the fact that I need food to live does nothing to change this fact, and so I have a reason to obtain food even if I do not recognize this reason. 

Third, Aristotelian Naturalists can appeal to the HPC view of natural kinds to avoid the supposed impositions of value regarding the essential features of human nature.  Kitcher’s objections are aimed at a classical essentialist understanding of human nature, and if the Aristotelian Naturalist makes use of the HPC view, then his objections miss their mark.  For example, the HPC view does not take any properties to be essential in that they are shared by all members of the species.  Instead, all members of the species have sets of properties that are a subset of a cluster of properties sustained by the homeostatic mechanisms definitive of the kind.  Therefore, we need not select some properties to the exclusion of others as constituting the “essence” of human nature, for all of the properties that humans have that also cluster together due to the underlying mechanisms that sustain them are important in marking out human nature.  The clustering properties are those that are characteristic of humans and this is an objective matter.

However, one can privilege properties and mechanisms above others if they explain the other properties and mechanism.  That is, we may take such central properties and mechanisms to be only those that are needed to fully explain all of the other properties, no more and no less.   As has already been said, rationality is such a property, and for the vast majority of humans, this feature explains most of our actions and is distinctive of our kind.  Those who lack rationality are naturally defective in some way (e.g., due to disease, insufficient development).  Since this is simply a descriptive fact about humans, it is an objective assessment and as such does not impose our values upon nature. 

Regarding the interaction of the environment and a species’ characteristic features, the HPC view explicitly claims that external causal mechanisms are partly constitutive of a species’ identity since a species’ boundaries are determined by the boundaries of the homeostatic mechanisms that sustain the cluster of properties that we associate with the species.   As such, human nature is partly defined by extrinsic features such as the environment.  To separate a species from its natural environment (i.e., the environment that contains the homeostatic mechanisms that sustains a species’ property cluster) is to make a mistake; a species is essentially defined by its environment (among other things).  In other words, the ‘normal’ environment is the one that sustains a species’ characteristic features and the one to which the species has naturally adapted, and this is also an objective matter.  Thus, Kitcher’s claim that the Aristotelian Naturalist must impose value on nature can be rejected. 

Fourth, post-Darwinian biology is teleological to a large degree, although such teleology has been naturalized.[18]  Allen and Bekoff notice that “even a cursory scan of the theoretical literature reveals that biologists have found it difficult and even undesirable to eliminate teleological notions from their discussions of biological phenomena” (Allen and Bekoff 610).  And while claims about “function” or “design” are rarely explicitly made in the empirical literature, it is not difficult to find implicit claims regarding both function and design (Allen and Bekoff 611).  Krohs similarly remarks that “biologists ascribe functions to characters or components of organisms without great hesitation” (Krohs 69).  So Foot is right to claim that scientists frequently employ “a certain network of interrelated concepts such as function and purpose [when] there is evaluation of all kinds of living things, including human beings” (Foot 40). 

Perhaps Kitcher denies that teleology can be naturalized because he equates function with design,[19] but other philosophers of biology[20] do not equate them.  For instance, according to Allen and Bekoff, there are three components that make up the standard view of functional claims within biology:

(1) Functional claims in biology are intended to explain the existence or maintenance of a trait in a given population;

(2) Biological functions are causally relevant to the existence or maintenance of traits via the mechanism of natural selection;

(3) Functional claims in biology are fully grounded in natural selection and are not derivative of psychological uses of notions such as design, intention, and purpose.  (Allen and Bekoff 612).

So far, such “function” need not be oriented towards any ends or goals.  These functional claims are purely descriptive.  However, Allen and Bekoff go on to claim that a suitable characterization of “design” can also be naturally grounded:

Trait T is naturally designed to do X if and only if 

(i) X is a biological function of T, and           

(ii) T is the result of a process of change of (anatomical or behavioral) structure due to      natural selection that has resulted in T being more optimal (or better adapted) for X than   ancestral versions of T. (Allen and Bekoff  615)

For example, we can say that a bird’s wings are designed for flying because “(i) enabling flight is a biological function of birds' wings and (ii) extant morphological forms of such wings are the result of natural selection for variants that were better adapted for flying than earlier forms” (Allen and Bekoff  616). 

Since “the design of an entity serves as an instance that fixes the norm of functionality,” a designed entity can be assessed as to whether it is functionally good or bad (Krohs 79).  Krohs states that “a component is hypo/hyper-functioning with respect to its contribution to a capacity of an entity with design iff the actual component functions worse/better… with respect to this capacity then the standard one does” ( Krohs 84).  So if a particular bird’s wings do not allow it to fly well (compared to the standard wing found in its species), these wings are properly called defective.  Similarly, if human beings are not acting (morally) in accordance with the characteristic (ethical) features that humans have (and hence are violating their natural design), we can say that they are (morally) defective in some way. This is all that Aristotelian Naturalists like Foot wish to claim.  Consequently, Aristotelian Naturalism accords with contemporary biology and is not employing pre-Darwinian concepts.

Moving to the third objection that evolutionary theory is more compatible with an expressivist meaning of ethical terms, there is nothing that Kitcher has claimed that is necessarily at odds with an Aristotelian Naturalist understanding of moral terms.  In fact, many of his claims implicitly rely on the fact that humans have a nature that we ought to act in accordance with.  First, notice that the coordination of social behavior will only be successful if the rules that do the coordinating are properly based on human nature.  They must reflect truths about human nature, and so by learning them, one does in fact gain knowledge about the sorts of beings that humans are.  It is true that “each of us inherits a moral framework from those who socialize us” (Kitcher, “Biology” 175).  However, the framework that we inherit has been tested by human nature over thousands of years.  It has been refined and is based on what works and what does not work in accordance with our nature.  Facts about humans ground moral truths, and so contrary to Kitcher,[21] moral truths do play a role in “constraining the normative systems adopted” since normative systems that are contrary to human nature will ultimately fail (e.g., communism in the former Soviet Union).  The system will only be transmitted if it accurately reflects (to a high degree) moral truths, which is to say, only if it accurately reflects and represents human nature.  Thus, Kitcher is incorrect in claiming that “the criterion of success [for moral norms] isn’t accurate representation but the improvement of social cohesion in ways that promote the transmission of the system itself” (Kitcher, “Biology” 176).

Second, Kitcher explicitly relies on human nature to support his claims.  In his responses to the moral nihilist, he says that by denying the claims of morality the nihilist “is failing to realize his full human potential” (Kitcher, “Biology” 179).  But he can only say such a thing if there is a human nature that sets the standard by which we measure whether an individual is achieving his or her potential.  Consider what Kitcher says in full against the nihilist: 

To repudiate the authority of norms is… to abandon one’s human identity, to prefer to it a nonhuman mode of psychological life… [Consequently,] nihilism begins to look like a psychopathology, a deliberate rejection of part of ourselves.  It’s as if the nihilist had        decided to abandon the use of some faculty – the ears or the memory – in some exercise of self- mutilation… What’s at issue [then] is whether [the nihilist] can avoid the characterization of [denying moral authority] as an exercise in self-mutilation, an interference with normal human functioning.  Nor is this a small excision… but the deletion of a capacity central to human lives.  (Kitcher, “Biology” 180-1)
I doubt that an Aristotelian Naturalist could respond to the nihilist any better, for she would make the exact same point that Kitcher does.  As such, it is unclear what precisely Kitcher is attacking, for his arguments presuppose such a view of human nature.

Conclusion

Thus, I conclude that Aristotelian Naturalism is not at odds with contemporary biology, and is in fact supported by it to a very significant degree.  Each of the objections raised against Aristotelian Naturalism has either mischaracterized the view or has assumed that no simple modification could be made to avoid the objection, and so I have argued that a suitably explained and modified view does answer each of these objections.  Consequently, Aristotelian Naturalism is an internally coherent and objectively grounded metaethical theory that is extremely powerful, plausible, and, I believe, persuasive.

Works Cited and Consulted

Alexander, John.  “Non-Reductionist Naturalism: Nussbaum Between Aristotle and Hume.” Res
            Publica 11 (2005): 157-183. SpringerLink. Web. 10 Nov. 2011

Allen, Colin, and Marc Bekoff. “Biological Function, Adaptation, and Natural Design.”
            Philosophy of Science 62.4 (1995): 609-622. JSTOR. Web. 30 Nov. 2011.

Boyd, Richard. “Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa.” Species: New Interdisciplinary
            Essays. Ed. Robert Wilson. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999. 141-185. PDF file.

Brigandt, Ingo. “Natural Kinds in Evolution and Systematics: Metaphysical and Epistemological
          Considerations.” Ingo Brigandt – Publications. University of Alberta, n.d. Web.  9 Sept. 2011.

Craver, Carl.  “Mechanisms and Natural Kinds.”  Philosophical Psychology 22.5 (2009): 575-
            594.  Philosopher’s Index. Web. 9 Sept. 2011.

Foot, Philippa. Natural Goodness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Print.

Hacker-Wright, John. “What is Natural About Foot’s Ethical Naturalism?” Ratio 22.3 (2009):
            308-321.  Wiley Online Library.  Web. 10 Nov. 2011.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Print.

Kitcher, Phillip. “Biology and Ethics.” The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Ed. David
            Copp. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 163-185. Print.

---. “Essence and Perfection.” Ethics 110.1 (1999): 59-83.  JSTOR. Web. 30 Nov. 2011.

Krohs, Ulrich. “Functions as Based on a Concept of General Design.” Synthese 166.1 (2009): 69-
            89. JSTOR. Web. 30 Nov. 2011.

Magnus, P.D. “Drakes, Seadevils, and Similarity Fetishism.”  Biology and Philosophy (2011): 1-
            14. SpringerLink. Web. 9 Sept. 2011.

McDowell, John. “Two Sorts of Naturalism.” Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral
            Theory: Essays in Honour of Philippa Foot. Ed. Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and
            Warren Quinn. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.  149-179. Print.

Rieppel, Olivier.  “Species as a Process.”  Acta Biotheoretica 57.1-2 (2009): 33-49.
            SpringerLink. Web. 9 Sept. 2011.

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            Metaphilosophy 39.2 (2008): 220-250. Wiley Online Library.  Web. 10 Nov. 2011.

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            Biological Natural Kinds.”  Ingo Brigandt – Publications. University of Alberta, n.d. Web.  9
            Sept. 2011.

Footnotes

[1] McDowell is suspicious of attempting to validate an ethical view purely “on the basis of the facts of nature, on the disenchanted conception of nature yielded by modern science” (McDowell 157).  Following his lead, Hursthouse claims that ethical views must be validated “from within an acquired ethical outlook, not from some external ‘neutral’ point of view,” since we cannot get outside of them and because a scientific account of human nature will not get us very far (Hursthouse 165, 193).  Instead, an ethical viewpoint can be subjected to scrutiny bit by bit, changing significantly over time through a ‘Neurathian’ procedure (Hursthouse 166).  Such a procedure may not completely objectively ground one’s ethical view, but it will show that it is internally consistent and rationally justified.  However, I think that Aristotelian Naturalism must attempt to give a completely objective and natural account of morality that is completely justified by natural facts if it is to convince its critics that it is not only a coherent theory, but also a persuasive theory (since critics may hold a contrary view that is also coherent and rationally justified).  At best, the ‘Neurathian’ procedure should be a fall-back defense.  So, borrowing from Toner, any naturalist project must satisfy four requirements:

(1) Natural norms must be intrinsically able to motivate the bearer of the nature.

(2) Natural norms must be intrinsically able to justify themselves to the bearer of the nature.

(3) Natural norms must be anchored in and express universal human nature.

(4) First and second nature must be related so that the second is a natural outgrowth of the first... (Toner 234-6)

[2] There are many versions of Aristotelian Naturalism.  I will lump them together and only make distinctions where necessary.  However, I will primarily be using the views given by Hursthouse and Foot.

[3] Hursthouse believes that “’good’, like ‘small’, is an attributive adjective” (Hursthouse 195).  Similarly, Foot asserts that “evaluations of human will and action share a conceptual structure with evaluations of characteristics and operations of other living things, and can only be understood in these terms” (Foot 5).

[4] Foot similarly claims that “the way an individual should be is determined by what is needed for development, self-maintenance, and reproduction,” which is what all of the characteristic features of plants and animals directly or indirectly aim at (Foot 31, 33).  Some biologists might object that an organism’s traits are ultimately oriented towards gene replication, but it is obvious that at the very least, an individual’s survival and reproduction is an intermediate end and therefore a means to this ultimate end (Hacker-Wright 309).

[5] Similarly, an individual’s “goodness or defect is conceptually determined by the interaction of natural habitat and natural (species-general) ‘strategies’ for survival and reproduction” (Foot 42).

[6] It is important that this is characteristic freedom from pain. For example, for animals that characteristically feel pain upon receiving tissue damage, the lack of pain would be a defect.

[7] As Foot similarly writes, “human defects and excellences are similarly related to what human beings are and what they do” (Foot 15).

[8] Humans may have a different fundamental kind other than being primarily animals (e.g., souls, psychological persons, brains).  However, I doubt if any substantial changes to the meaning of our moral terms would depend on this change since the psychological and physical characteristics of what we are are present in each kind. 

[9] Notice that our rationality does not need to explain everything that we do.  Kitcher seems to assume that by making rationality a characteristic feature of human nature that it must explain everything about us, and since “the most consistently rational members of our species also do a host of things that aren’t explicable in rational terms [(e.g., breathe, blink, flinch)]” then rationality cannot be a defining feature of humans (Kitcher, “Essence 74).  However, our rationality only needs to explain many or most of our actions, especially in comparison to other living things, for it to be a distinctive feature of our species.

[10] Hursthouse is not alone in stressing the importance of our rational faculties.  Foot marks the distinction between animals and humans by saying that, “while animals go for the good (thing) that they see, human beings go for what they see as good” (Foot 56).  That is, humans assess things as good based on whether they have reasons to obtain or do them, whereas animals do not abstract away to a concept of ‘good’ nor reflect on reasons for obtaining or doing something.  Alexander attributes to Nussbaum the view that practical reason is an “architectonic principle that organizes the whole life, providing for its many activities” and which turns basic functionings that we share with plants and animals into human functionings by making them “parts of a life organized and infused by practical reason” (Alexander 176).  Finally, Toner interprets MacIntyre as claiming that “the power most distinctive of human beings as a species is, of course, rationality” (Toner 237).  Clearly, our capacity for rationality is the most important fact about our human nature.

[11] Similarly, Foot observes: “there is so much diversity in human beings and human cultures that the schema of natural normativity may seem to be inapplicable from the start” (Foot 43).

[12] McDowell claims that, “with the onset of reason, then, the nature of the species abdicates from a previously unquestionable authority over the behavior of the individual animal” (McDowell 154).  While he, Foot, and Hursthouse are worried that this leaves “the individual interest of the deliberator looking like the only candidate to take over the vacant throne,” I do not think this is a problem (McDowell 154).    If it is in the best interest of humans to be moral, then  humans should be (properly) self-interested.

[13] One cannot question the use of reason.  To ask, “why should I be rational?” is to seek a reason for seeking reasons, and so the very question presupposes the importance of rationality (Foot 65).

[14] Hursthouse points out that many smokers live to a ripe old age.  Still, we can confidently say that smoking will likely lead to a shortened and unhealthy life, due to the fact that there is a well-established link between smoking and a shortened and unhealthy life.  To disprove the claim that the virtues do not benefit their possessor, “what is needed… is not just a few cases, but a clearly identifiable pattern” that the virtues actually harm their possessor (Hursthouse 174).

[15] Biological altruism: “an organism A acts altruistically toward another organism B just in case A’s action increases B’s reproductive success while diminishing A’s own reproductive success” (Kitcher, “Biology” 166).

[16] Psychological altruism: “a tendency to adjust one’s desires, plans, and intentions in light of one’s assessment of the desires, plans, and intentions of others, the adjustment consisting in bringing one’s own attitudes closer to those attributed to the others (closer in the sense that the altruist comes to have wants, plans, and intentions with a content that is favorable to the other’s achieving or fulfilling his wants, plans and intentions)” (Kitcher, “Biology” 170).

[17] Examples of homeostatic mechanisms for species include “unique common evolutionary origin” (Rieppel 34), “social roles” (Boyd 153), “gene exchange between certain populations and reproductive isolation from others, effects of common selective factors, coadapted gene complexes and other limitation on heritable variation, developmental constraints, the effects of the organism-caused features of evolutionary niches” (Boyd 165), and other “historical relations among the members” (Magnus 8). 

[18] Teleology has become naturalized when it does not “involve the goals or purposes of a psychological agent” (Allen and Bekoff  611).

[19] Allen and Bekoff quote Kitcher as claiming that “the function of an entity S is what S is designed to do” (Allen and Bekoff  611).

[20] Allen, Bekoff, Krohs, and Millikan are just a few. 

[21] (Kitcher, “Biology” 176).

The Instrumental Value of Truth

I wrote this paper for a class on "Truth" while completing my MA in Philosophy.  This was submitted on May 9, 2011 and remains as I submitted it (apart from formatting changes).
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We generally take it to be a good thing for people to have true beliefs and a bad thing for people to have false beliefs.  As such, it would seem that true beliefs are valuable and therefore truth is valuable.  But what does it mean to value truth?  Furthermore, what sort of value does truth have?  Both of these questions are addressed by Paul Horwich and Michael Lynch, and though they differ with regard to the nature of truth, they give fairly similar answers to these two questions.  Horwich believes that what it means to value truth is given by the VT principle: “it is desirable to believe what is true and only what is true” (Horwich, “The Value” 347).  Lynch offers a similar principle called TE: “it is prima facie good that one believes all and only what is true” (Lynch, “The Values” 226).  These and other characterizations express the same basic idea that it is good or desirable to believe what is true and bad or undesirable to believe what is not true.  But is this goodness intrinsic or extrinsic?  If truth has intrinsic value, then its value is inherent; it is valuable for its own sake apart from any of our goals (e.g., ethical, aesthetic, hedonistic) and desirable even when it conflicts with these goals (Horwich, Truth 62).  On the other hand, if truth has extrinsic value, then its value is externally determined.  One such extrinsic value is instrumental value, and if truth has instrumental value, it is valuable insofar as it helps us to achieve other ends.  If it does not help us achieve these ends, then it lacks instrumental value.  Both Horwich and Lynch take truth to always have intrinsic value even when it lacks instrumental value.  On the contrary, I will defend the view that truth does not have intrinsic value.  Instead, truth is only instrumentally valuable and so not all true beliefs are valuable.  I will consider the arguments that Horwich and Lynch put forward to defend their claim, offer criticisms, and provide reasons for believing that truth is only instrumentally valuable.

 Why should we believe that truth is more than instrumentally good and hence intrinsically valuable?  Both Horwich and Lynch propose many reasons.  First, Horwich claims that people generally believe that knowledge is valuable for its own sake.  He writes, “there is widespread sentiment to the effect that certain items of knowledge are desirable regardless of any practical use to which someone might decide to put them” (Horwich, “The Value” 351).  However, Horwich himself offers an instrumental explanation for why this is the case.  He claims, “it is presumably because most truths are useful in practical inference … that our society, simplifying for the sake of effectiveness, inculcates a general concern for truth for its own sake… [This explains] our tendency to believe that there is such a fact [that truth is valuable for its own sake]” (Horwich, “The Value” 351).  But if this is true, then we have no reason to take the supposed fact that most people believe knowledge to be valuable for its own sake as support for the claim that truth is intrinsically valuable.

Second, Lynch claims that “there are times in most of our lives when we simply want to know for no other reason than the knowing itself” (Lynch, “Minimalism” 502).  Thus, truth is often sought for its own sake without considering practical concerns and so it must have intrinsic value.  Furthermore, since truth can be sought for its own sake, one can justify many types of academic inquiry such as “ancient history, metaphysics, and esoteric areas of mathematics – fields that may not be expected to have any pragmatic payoff” (Horwich, “The Value” 351).  Horwich believes that such fields of inquiry are obviously justified, and since they could only be justified if truth were intrinsically valuable, truth must have intrinsic value. 

However, one can simply deny that such fields of inquiry are justified in this way.  For example, researchers in each of these fields enjoy their work and so it satisfies their interests and the interests of those who follow their work.  Similarly, satisfying our various curiosities brings us pleasure and so it is not without practical value.  Furthermore, contrary to Horwich’s assumption, these fields of inquiry do have practical value beyond a mere satisfaction of interests.  Most researchers take themselves to be pursuing inquiry that is practically useful or may in the future turn out to be so.  For example, ancient history teaches us about ourselves and from its lessons we can act more wisely in our own day.  Metaphysics seeks to understand what the world fundamentally is like and the various answers it gives do have practical implications (e.g., I should live my life one way if God exists and another way if God does not exist).  Finally, many once esoteric areas of mathematics have been discovered to practically apply to other fields (e.g., physics, computer science).  Thus, it seems that one can justify each of these fields of inquiry, and our supposedly non-practical curiosity, by reference to purely instrumental considerations.  Thus, truth need not be intrinsically valuable.

Third, Lynch claims that “unless truth has more than instrumental value, there would be nothing wrong with believing trivial falsehoods… [But] the falsity of a proposition is in fact a terminal objection to believing it” (Lynch, “Minimalism” 502).  Lynch is not claiming that it is morally wrong to believe a false proposition.  Instead, the supposed wrongness of believing a false proposition has to do with epistemic or cognitive wrongness.  Lynch takes the purpose of our cognitive capacities to be the attainment of truth for the sake of truth.  He writes, “truth is a goal of inquiry in the sense of being a proper end of our epistemic practices” (Lynch, “The Values” 226).  Since our epistemic practices are properly aimed at truth, then it is “correct” to believe true and only true propositions (Lynch, “The Values” 228).  Thus, beliefs are properly evaluated, that is, judged to be correct or incorrect, only with regard to whether or not they are true.

However, this view seems too narrow.  Given what we know about our evolutionary past, it seems that the purpose of our cognitive capacities is not to attain truth for its own sake, but to attain truth for our sake.  That is, the function of our cognitive capacities may be to attain truth, but as part of a larger biological system, they are ultimately ordered to helping us survive and flourish in our environment.  So while a belief may be “correct” with regard to our cognitive capacities alone because it accords with the truth, it may not be correct or best for us with regard to our surviving and flourishing which is its ultimate end. 

Such a claim seems incompatible with Lynch’s insistence that inquiry (i.e., trying to figure out what to believe) can only be understood as aiming at true beliefs (Lynch, “The Values” 230).  He writes that “an activity whose aims don’t include true belief isn’t bad inquiry: it is not inquiry at all” (Lynch, “The Values” 238).  Lynch suggests that instead such practices would be akin to “wishful thinking” since the epistemic agent would not be aiming at the truth (Lynch, “The Values” 239). But the person that takes truth to only be instrumentally valuable can accept this claim.  One can say that the agent who is engaging in inquiry and seeking the truth is doing so for instrumental reasons.  However, when not aiming at the truth, one may not be engaging in inquiry, but one is still using one’s cognitive capacities correctly with regard to their overall function within the larger system.  Such rationalization or selective justification may be criticized from the standpoint of ideal rationality.  But such rationality is not always ideal for our overall wellbeing and this is what our cognitive capacities are supposed to serve. 

Lynch even seems to concede as much by admitting in a footnote that beliefs are only prima facie correct since there may be other norms operating on belief.  “Justification and rationality, for example, are normative, and they operate over belief.  Moreover, they can conflict with the norm of truth – what is justified isn’t always true.  Nor is believing what is false always irrational” (Lynch, “The Values” 228).  But if this is the case, then in accordance with my argument above, one can have “correct” beliefs that are not true since the norm of truth may be defeated by other norms.

This criticism can also be brought out by another claim Lynch makes.  When considering whether inquiry itself is valuable, he admits that he cannot give a non-circular answer since doing so would presuppose the value of inquiry: the question “asks us to provide an epistemic reason, an argument, and a justification for the practice of giving reasons, arguments, and justifications.  And that obviously can’t be done, for those activities are constitutive of inquiry, whose aim is the formation of true beliefs” (Lynch, “The Value” 239).  But there is no need to appeal to an epistemic reason when one can justify inquiry by instrumental reasons.  Clearly, inquiry is generally very useful in helping us to achieve our aims because having true beliefs related to our goals will help us to satisfy these goals.  So it seems that inquiry is justified by its ability to help us acquire true beliefs related to practical aims and not justified for its own sake.  If it were, we should be doing wrong by ceasing to engage in inquiry in any circumstance and this is not true.  I only do wrong if I cease inquiry in certain circumstances (e.g., I am liable for the knowledge such inquiry would achieve).  Thus, contrary to Lynch’s claim that a proposition’s being false is a terminal reason to reject it and hence truth is intrinsically valuable, it is possible to have “correct” beliefs that are not true, and this correctness relates to their instrumental value.

Fourth, both Horwich and Lynch claim that that our intuition that it would be good to know all things as God does supports the claim that truth is intrinsically valuable.  Horwich writes that we are inclined “to think that a ‘perfect being’ would be omniscient” (Horwich, “The Value” 357).  Lynch similarly claims that “it is prima facie good to be omniscient… it is good to be God, as it were” (Lynch, “The Values” 226).  However, this claim is at least equally and perhaps better supported by saying that truth is only instrumentally valuable. [1]  Consider the traditional formulation of a perfect being as being all good, all powerful, and all knowing.  If that being was not all good, then we wouldn’t value its having all knowledge since such knowledge could be used for evil.  Similarly, if that being was not all powerful, then such a being could not use its knowledge to do everything good that it wished to accomplish.

Some people use such considerations to explain the problem of evil.  The open theist claims that God lacks knowledge since, given that God is all powerful, God would prevent any evil that God knew about and knew how to prevent.  Similarly, if God lacks power, then God knows how to prevent all evil but simply cannot do so.  Thus, it appears that we have compelling reasons to believe that omniscience is valuable only insofar as it is related to perfect power and perfect goodness, and therefore it is only instrumentally valuable.   Indeed, even the most trivial of true propositions is instrumentally valuable to a being that needs to providentially govern all things with certainty of success.  Thus, the intuition that omniscience is valuable provides better support for the claim that truth is only instrumentally valuable.

Fifth, Lynch suggests that if truth’s value could be explained by something else such as its instrumentality, “then if I had two beliefs b1 and b2 with identical instrumental value, I should not prefer to believe b1 rather than b2” where b1 is true and b2 is false (Lynch, “Minimalism” 502).  Since we would prefer the true belief to the false belief, truth must have value apart from its instrumentality.  He offers the following examples to illustrate this point.  Consider whether it would be good to believe truly or falsely concerning some extremely abstract mathematical propositions.  Suppose that we knew that these propositions would never have any instrumental value whatsoever.  Then, “if we were forced to choose between believing truly or falsely about the matter, we would surely prefer the former” (Lynch, “Minimalism” 502). 

Lynch also cites thought experiments like one’s being deceived unknowingly by Descartes’ evil demon.  He observes that being in the demon world would be experientially and consequentially the same as being in the actual world, even though one’s beliefs would largely be false in one world and largely true in the other. The same can be said of living in a “Russell world” in which the world began two minutes ago and almost all of my past beliefs are false.  However, my false beliefs about the past in the “Russell world” have the same consequences as my true beliefs in the actual world and so they are instrumentally identical.  Since we would prefer to live in the actual world and have true beliefs, this non-instrumental difference is what matters and that is why we are disturbed by being “undetectably wrong” (Lynch, “Minimalism” 503).

Considering the abstract mathematical propositions first, it is not obvious to me that we should prefer to guess correctly.  Excluding the possibility in which our being “forced” to choose has practical implications, it seems at least as plausible that many people will simply not care whether they have a true belief or not in these circumstances.  The belief is too trivial to have any significance and so it does not matter if one knows it to be true or not. [2]   Such a case is different from the evil demon and “Russell world” scenarios since knowing the truth in these circumstances would make a practical difference.  If I knew that I was deceived by an evil demon or living in a “Russell world”, I would live my life differently because these truths are very significant. [3]   In order for Lynch’s argument to work, he needs us to prefer a true but trivial belief to a false but trivial belief of identical instrumental value.  That is, he needs us to prefer a true belief over a false belief even when knowing that a belief is true does not, would not, and could not, make a difference in how we live our lives.  Again, it seems that that most people would simply not care if such a belief were true or not.  They would not desire to know the truth and we would not find anything particularly wrong with them if they held such a belief that was false. [4]  This shows that the value of truth really depends upon the content of belief and not on whether it is true.  If we take the belief to be about something valuable, then knowing its truth or falsity will be valuable as well.  If the belief is trivial and hence the truth it contains is trivial, then it seems that we will not regard its truth as valuable.  Thus, whether a belief is valuable depends upon its instrumental importance and hence the value of its truth is also a matter of instrumentality.

Sixth, Lynch suggests that we still seek the truth even when there will be negative consequences and hence it is not instrumentally valuable. Considering a cheating spouse, Lynch writes that  “people often wish to know the truth about a spouse’s infidelity even when there is an excellent chance that nothing productive will come of it” (Lynch, “Minimalism” 502).  However, while something good may not come of it, it seems that in these situations people believe that something good will come of it.  At the very least, knowing the truth about this infidelity will end the uncertainty and worries about what may or may not be happening behind one’s back.  Furthermore, knowing the truth may strengthen the relationship in the long run or end the marital relationship for the eventual good of all parties.  Thus, the spouse hopes that the truth will be instrumentally good, even though it may not in fact be good.  In all similar cases, it seems that one can easily offer this sort of explanation, and hence we do not need to appeal to any intrinsic value in truth to explain this occurrence.

 Given the foregoing arguments, I conclude that neither Lynch nor Horwich has provided any compelling reasons for believing that truth is more than instrumentally useful.  However, the most obvious and I believe compelling reason for limiting truth’s value to instrumentality is that there are true beliefs that are not valuable.  This can be understood in two ways.  First, there are truths that we wish were not true and hence do not value.  These beliefs directly conflict with our goals and desires.  Consider the example of spousal infidelity.  Suppose that your wife is cheating on you.  If you could choose the option to remain in ignorant bliss and live happily ever after or choose to know the truth and thereby experience pain and suffering for the rest of your life, then it seems to me that you may be better off not knowing the truth. Thus, not all truths are desirable. [5]   Second, there are also beliefs that we do not wish to know whether they are true or false.  Whatever the case may be, it is of no importance to us. [6]  These beliefs indirectly conflict with our goals and desires.  They are “too trivial to be worth finding out about or worth remembering” and so would keep us from more important pursuits (Horwich, “The Value” 348).  For example, one might suggest that knowing the average length of grass on the lawn in front of my apartment does not appear to be either useful or intrinsically valuable.  Hence, it is not desirable to know all truths.

In response, Horwich and Lynch claim that the value of many truths can be overridden by other concerns.  We value many different things and quite often our different goals will conflict with each other.  Since we cannot satisfy them all, we must choose some over others and thereby sacrifice some values for the sake of others. For example, suppose a situation in which obtaining some information would be very dangerous. Horwich suggests that in this situation it would not be a bad thing, all things considered, if no investigation were undertaken or if the investigation led to a wrong answer (Horwich, “The Value” 348).  Thus, there may be cases in which it is good to believe something even though it is false.  Similarly, considering cases in which the truths to be acquired are too trivial or too complicated, both Lynch and Horwich suggest that finding out the truth may be too costly and not worth the effort.  Hence, it may not be desirable, all things considered, to pursue and believe all truths (Horwich, “The Value” 348; Lynch, “Minimalism” 500-1).  So “while it is always good that one believe only the truth, it is not always good, all things considered” (Lynch, “The Values” 227).  Thus, the truth remains valuable even when that value is overridden by other concerns. 

The difficulty with this response is that if truth is intrinsically valuable, then it seems that we should be doing something wrong by letting other concerns overrule our pursuit of it.  Consider the moral case in which humans can be regarded as instrumentally valuable or as valuable for their own sake.  If taken to be instrumentally valuable, then a human’s rights can be violated for the sake of some greater end (e.g., the greatest happiness in society).  However, if humans have value for their own sake, then we morally wrong them by violating these rights.  In other words, their worth is inviolable and no overall assessment can make violating this worth morally correct.  Similarly, if truth is only instrumentally valuable, then we do nothing wrong by not seeking or not believing it if, given an overall assessment, it is not worth it. [7]   However, if truth is intrinsically valuable, then it must be sought and believed at all costs if we are to avoid committing some sort of cognitive or epistemic wrong. 

At times Lynch seems to admit this.  For example, he writes that “the recognition that p is true is a decisive reason to believe it” (Lynch, “The Values” 230).  But it is difficult to reconcile this claim with his and Horwich’s claim that all things considered, it might be better to have a false belief.  In order to join these two competing claims one could suggest that it is permissible to abandon truth only if seeking and believing the truth conflicted with an equal or greater intrinsic value of some other kind (e.g., happiness).  However, Lynch and Horwich allow non-intrinsically-valuable considerations to overrule truth (e.g., one’s time, one’s resources).  Such considerations may be a means to a greater intrinsic value, but if truth is competing with these on the same level then it seems more plausible that it also is a means to a greater end.  Thus, it is more reasonable that truth is only instrumentally valuable.

In the end, I must admit that, like Lynch, these arguments are not conclusive.  Lynch writes that his reasons do not prove that we are “correct to believe that truth is more than instrumentally good: what they show is that for many people, the idea that truth is good is part of a tacit folk-theoretic conception of truth” (Lynch, “Minimalism” 505). [8]   However, I have shown that such considerations are consistent with believing truth to only be instrumentally valuable.  Given the additional reasons I put forward, I also conclude that it is more plausible to hold that truth is not intrinsically valuable and that its value comes from instrumental reasons only.

Footnotes

[1] David also notices the relationship between knowledge and power and points out that Lynch has not distinguished between what is good for God and what is good for us (David 298).  Lynch responds that “We don’t need to do theology to understand why caring about believing the truth as such is good for us… [W]e only need to think about the role that caring about truth plays in human flourishing” (Lynch, “Replies” 333).  However, such a response is compatible with truth being valuable only as a means to our flourishing.

[2] David makes this same point when considering trivial truths that we acquire without cost: “Do we really care about believing trivial truths that come for free? In the end, this is of course a personal question. But I suspect quite a few people will say: Not at all” (David 298).  Similarly, there is an “introspective conviction, which I think quite a few people have, that they simply don’t care about believing trivial truths and simply don’t care about believing free trivial truths either” (David 298).

[3] David offers a different objection: “The expected response, namely that I prefer to live in the normal world, indicates at best that I want my beliefs, the beliefs I actually have, to be true, that I want to live in the world in which the beliefs that I actually have are true. This does not indicate that I want to believe whatever is true” (David 297).

[4] Papineau similarly writes: “Consider people who aim deliberately to mislead themselves… Are these people acting wrongly? Of course, they aren't doing what they need to, if they want their beliefs to be true. But by hypothesis they don't want their beliefs to be true. So is there any other sense in which they are proceeding improperly?  It is not obvious to me that there is” (Papineau 24).

[5] Papineau agrees: “it can sometimes be quite proper… not to be moved by the aim of truth” (Papineau 24).

[6] David goes even further in denying Lynch’s claim: even if we restrict ourselves to “non-trivial, important, and humanly graspable propositions[,] there are still way too many truths of that sort for me to have that many wants” (David 299). 

[7] One might go further in saying that no wrong is committed by not seeking the truth in any case.  For example, Papineau believes the claim that “there is always some reason to seek the truth, even if it can be overridden” to be “implausible” (Papineau 25).
 
[8]   Elsewhere, Lynch also writes: “I don’t claim that these arguments show that truth has intrinsic worth… I like to think it does have such value, but I am pessimistic that any argument could prove the point” (Lynch, “Replies” 334). 

Works Cited and Consulted

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Horwich, Paul. Truth. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford, 1998. Print.

---. “The Value of Truth.” Noûs 40.2 (2006): 347-360. Wiley Online Library. Web. 29 April
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(2004): 497-517. Wiley Online Library. Web. 29 April 2011.

---. “Replies to Critics.” Philosophical Books 46.4 (2005): 331-42. Wiley Online Library. Web. 7
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---. “The Values of Truth and the Truth of Values.” Epistemic Value. Ed.  Adrian Haddock, Alan
Millar, and Duncan Pritchard. New York: Oxford, 2009. 225-42. Print.

McGrath, Matthew. “Lynch on the Value of Truth.” Philosophical Books 46.4 (2005): 302-310. 
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Papineau, David. “Normativity and Judgement.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73.1
(1999): 17-43.  JSTOR. Web. 7 May 2011.

 Piller, Christian.  “Desiring the Truth and Nothing But the Truth.”  Noûs 43.2 (2009): 193-213.
Wiley Online Library. Web. 7 May 2011.

POS News Update: Best of 2015

In a previous post, I described an experiment with automating Twitter posts using news headlines with the nouns switched around.  I have been auto-Tweeting these posts since July 2015.  Here are 5 of my favorites from 2015, along with my best interpretation of what news items they came from and my take on them:

1. 'EARLY LABOR OF OVARIAN PUTIN MAY BECOME POSSIBLE'

Ovarian cancer screening,  an announcement from the labor department, and a Putin endorsement of Donald Trump.

I didn't know Putin had ovaries, much less that he was pregnant.  Still, I hope he doesn't deliver before the baby is ready, even if it is possible.

2. 'HUCKABEE[,] MUSK, STEPHEN HAWKING WANT TO SAVE THE WEBSITE FROM LETTUCE CONCERNS'

Musk and Hawking wanting to "save the world from killer robots", Huckabee's use of the word "holocaust", and lettuce causing food poisoning.

 You've heard of the attack of killer tomatoes.  Now, lettuce is going after the internet.  Who will save us?  An unlikely alliance of a conservative politician, a tech entrepreneur, and a theoretical physicist.

3. 'REVIEW: OBAMACARE GOES 'ROGUE' IN NEW 'MISSION''

A combination of Tom Cruise's "Rogue Nation" Mission Impossible and articles relating to Obamacare and efforts to repeal it.

Republicans say the President has "gone rogue" and overstepped his authority by implementing the Affordable Care Act with the mission to cover every American with health insurance.  Will he accomplish his task?  Tune in next open enrollment.

4. 'FOOTBALL PRICES PROBABLY WON'T HELP YOUR LOWER BACK CHINA'

Oil prices, football games, steroid injections that don't help lower back pain, the China stock crash, and Biden probably won't beat Clinton in a presidential nomination contest.   

As for your back pain China, better let go of relying on football sales to ease your suffering.  It's not going to help.

5. 'POLL: CLINTON [...] RELEASES LIVE CONFEDERATE NETFLIX PREACHER'

A poll about Biden versus Clinton running, the Confederate flag controversy, Netflix announcing parental leave changes, and the arrest of an Islamic preacher for supporting ISIS.   

I am glad that Clinton released this man alive.  Even if he is a Confederate, we all still need to hear the good news of movies mailed to our door and streamed over the internet.

Want more? Follow me on Twitter at @philanalytics to get the latest #POSNewsUpdate.