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Introduction
Aristotelian Naturalism is a form of ethical naturalism, which is broadly “the enterprise of basing ethics in some way on considerations of human nature” (Hursthouse 192). Or as Kitcher puts it, it is an “endeavor to explain the meaning of central moral terms by drawing on biological insights” (Kitcher, “Biology” 164). As such, Aristotelian Naturalism is an attempt to ground ethical norms in that way that human beings naturally are, and thus, to give an account of morality that is completely natural and objective.[1] However, such a view faces difficulties if it is at odds with contemporary biology, and as Kitcher claims, “there is an established orthodoxy among leading biologists and philosophers of biology that would dismiss any grounding of value in ‘human nature’ as unpromising” (Kitcher, “Essence” 61). Is Aristotelian Naturalism at odds with post-Darwinian biology? I will argue that it is not. In this paper I will explain what Aristotelian Naturalism is and what it is committed to. I will address objections to the view that are based on biological considerations largely derived from evolutionary views of nature. I find that each of these objections fails, either because it either mischaracterizes the view or because a simple modification can be made to avoid the objection. Thus, I conclude that Aristotelian Naturalism is an extremely powerful, plausible, and persuasive metaethical view.
Summary of View
What is Aristotelian Naturalism in its contemporary form?[2] The basic idea is that we can assign value to an individual of a certain species by looking at what is “normal” or “characteristic” with regards to the species as a whole. As Foot claims, whether an individual has natural goodness “depends directly on the relation of an individual to the ‘life form’ of its species” (Foot 26-7). Thus, we must assess individuals according to the “nature of the species to which the individual belongs,” and it is this nature that determines how individuals should be (Foot 27, 32). Consequently, an evaluation of “goodness” or “badness” is akin to other types of natural evaluation and not anything especially different.[3]
For example, Hursthouse claims that we can and do evaluate plants as being good or bad specimens with respect to their species according to their (i) parts and (ii) their operations and whether these are good or bad themselves (Hursthouse 198). What makes a plant’s parts and operations either good or bad depends on “whether they are contributing, in the way characteristic of such a member of such a species, to (1) individual survival through the characteristic life span of such a member of such a species and (2) continuance of the species” (Hursthouse 198).[4] Thus, there are two aspects of plants that are naturally oriented towards two ends. If an individual plant has parts and operations that are not characteristically contributing to individual and species survival, then it is a defective or bad plant.
It is important to note that such evaluations are made in the context of an environment. The appropriate context of assessment for what counts as an “excellence” or “defect” in an individual member of a species is the “natural habitat of the species” (Foot 34). Given that plants, animals, and humans have evolved within specific environments of the natural world, it only makes sense to assess them with these specific environments in mind. It would be wrong to claim that monkeys are defective since they cannot breathe underwater, for monkeys do not actually live under water. Living things must be critically assessed according to the environments in which they actually live and have adapted for. Based on these natural facts about individuals and their species as well as facts about the environments that these species live in, we can evaluate individuals according to whether they are living well as members of a species as situated in that species’ natural environment.[5]
When we turn to animals, they are evaluated according to a third aspect: (iii) whether they act well (in the way characteristic of their species) (Hursthouse 199). This is done with respect to (1) and (2) as well as to a third end (3): “characteristic freedom from pain and characteristic pleasure or enjoyment” (Hursthouse 199).[6] This is especially true for animals with more advanced cognitive capacities, which leads to a fourth aspect: (iv) emotions and desires. Higher level animals not only experience pain and pleasure but have emotions and desires, and these are oriented towards a fourth end: (4) “the good functioning of the social group” (Hursthouse 201). A social group is functioning well when it effectively enables its members to live well in the characteristic way of the species, that is, by supporting individual survival, individual freedom from pain enjoyment of pleasure, and individual development of capacities (Hursthouse 201-2).
When we come to humans, there is no sudden change in how to evaluate them. It is very natural to assume that “the criteria of goodness in human beings must be related to what human beings are and/or do, as such,”[7] and so they are evaluated in the same way that plants and animals are evaluated (Hursthouse 206). Humans are taken to be part of the natural order of the world, and hence, can be evaluated according to their natural properties. As Hursthouse points out, “what human beings are is a species of rational, social animals and thereby a species of living things – which… have a particular biological make-up and a natural life cycle” (Hursthouse 206).[8] However, humans are distinct from other higher-level animals in that, given our higher-level cognitive capacities, we are primarily[9] moved to act from reason instead of being determined by unreflective inclination or nature; our rationality has a “genuinely transforming effect” on our basic biological structure that creates a “huge gap” between us and other animals (Hursthouse 218-20).[10] Since our rationality leads humans to live in a variety of seemingly different ways,[11] and since we can even reflect on and question our nature,[12] the only characteristic and unquestionable[13] way of living that humans have in common is a ‘rational way,’ where a ‘rational way,’ is defined as “any way that we can rightly see as good, as something we have reason to do” (Hursthouse 222).
What do we have reason to do? Hursthouse hints that reason is primarily oriented towards helping us attain our “characteristic enjoyments,” which are “any enjoyments we can rightly see as good, as something we in fact enjoy and that reason can rightly endorse” (Hursthouse 222). Foot similarly claims that humans aim at ‘happiness,’ where ‘happiness’ is to be taken as “the enjoyment of good things, meaning enjoyment in attaining, and in pursuing, right ends” (Foot 97). The right ends are exactly those ends which characteristically belong to the human species, and so to act in accordance with reason is to attain and find enjoyment in those ends (e.g., basic needs, social relationships). Thus, to act morally or well is to act in accordance with what reason endorses and to act immorally or badly is to act contrary to practical reason; “moral action is rational action” (Foot 24). Foot even goes so far as to say that “moral action is a requirement of practical rationality” (Foot 21). Similarly, we evaluate a person as morally good or bad with respect to whether her rational will is oriented towards what is naturally good for her (Foot 66). In other words, it is our acting from reason “that makes us good or bad human beings in the ethical sense” (Hursthouse 207).
Since acting from reason is to act in accordance with our characteristic enjoyments, which depend on our nature, “it is still the case that human beings are ethically good in so far as their ethically relevant aspects foster the four ends appropriate to a social animal, in the way characteristic of the species” (Hursthouse 224). For virtue ethicists, these ethically relevant aspects are the virtues, and so we can say that “the virtues make their possessor a good human being” since “human beings need the virtues in order to live well, to flourish as human beings, to live a characteristically good, eudaimon, human life” (Hursthouse 167). In sum, as Hursthouse writes:
The truth of ‘this action is right’ is dependent on the truth of ‘This is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances’; the truth of that is dependent upon (i) what an agent with a certain character trait would do in the circumstances and (ii) whether that character trait is a virtue. The truth of (ii), whether the character trait in question is a virtue, depends on whether the character trait conduces to the four naturalistic ends (in a rational way) and the truth of that depends in part on human interests and desires. (Hursthouse 239)
Right action is action that conduces to our human nature, which leads to our flourishing as human beings.
Consequently, the answer to the question “why be moral?” is that acting morally benefits the actor based on her nature as a human being, and so acting morally is the only rational thing to do (Hursthouse 251). However, it is important to point out, as Hursthouse does, that having the virtues does not guarantee that one will always flourish or that they are necessary for flourishing (Hursthouse 172-3). Many virtuous people have met with tragedy in spite of and even because of their virtue. But exceptions to a “rule” do not disprove it so long as there is a general pattern upon which the rule is based.[14] Most people will agree that “if we act well, things go well for us. When it does not, when eudaimonia is impossible to achieve or maintain, that’s not ‘what we should have expected’ but tragically bad luck” (Hursthouse 185). Thus, the claim that “the virtues benefit their possessor” should be taken as meaning that living a virtuous life is the “only reliable bet” for living a flourishing life and that “that no ‘regimen’ [for how one should live one’s life] will serve one better” (Hursthouse 172-3). That is, if we want to live well, our best bet is to live according to the virtues. And this is a good bet since such a life is rooted in our nature as human beings and so we are simply living in accordance with the type of beings that we are.
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