Continued from: Part 1
These and similar statements can be fleshed out into a fuller account. First, notice that whether or not an individual has a proper name depends on the social and linguistic community. According to Kripke, an individual bears a proper name in virtue of being directly assigned that name through an initial “baptism” that rigidly fixes the reference (Bean 307). However, the “baptism” must be initiated and accepted by the community. Bean more fully states that “firstly a proper name works, i.e. denotes an entity, because it has been rightfully bestowed and consequently ‘belongs to’ its bearer. Secondly, for the name to be correctly used, members of the community must concur on the identity… of what it is to which the name belongs” (Bean 307). Thus, it is the decision of members of the community to give a proper name to an individual in accordance with their attitudes towards the individual.
This theory bears out in practice. Consider the naming ritual of the Ibo of Nigeria. A newborn child is not given a name for 28 days, but is instead referred to as the “new child” (Wieschoff 212). After 28 days the name is determined by social conditions: the social standing of the parents, the socially perceived character of the child, and the community’s acceptance of any name given. Even the meanings of names reflect social conditions and events surrounding the birth of the child (e.g., the place of birth, the financial status of the parents, future hopes for the child) (Wieschoff 214). Bean notices that a similar pattern is followed in other cultures: the “bestowal of a child’s name is often the duty of the parents, but is as likely to be the duty of a senior kinsman or of a ritual specialist and the participation of members of the larger community is usually required” (Bean 309).
Consider our own experiences. In our culture, a baby is given a name by his or her parents and this is accepted by the community. Even when an adult changes her name, it is not until her name has gone through a legal process and is accepted by the legal system (which acts on behalf of the social community) that her new name is properly her name. One can also imagine a person attempting to give herself a nickname but nobody calls her by it. We would not say that this is her name. Her social community must first accept the nickname as referring to her before it becomes hers. Thus, a first condition on an individual’s having a name is that (i) a social community has bestowed that individual with a name and accepted that name as referring to that individual.
For reasons already given, we should include condition (2). So if an individual has a proper name, (ii) there is a continued interest in the identity of the individual over time. However, now we can specify what kind of interest there is in the individual. Jeshion gives what she calls the Significance Guides Naming Principle: “an agent can name an individual only if she accords intrinsic or relational significance to that individual” (Jeshion 374). In other words, one names an individual in order to recognize that individual’s intrinsic or relational worth. Intrinsic worth is worth that an individual has of its own and for its own sake. It cannot be bestowed but only affirmed. Thus, if someone names a being that has intrinsic worth, one is recognizing and affirming that intrinsic worth instead of giving it worth.
Relational worth can be either instrumental worth or sentimental worth. An individual is instrumentally valuable if it is useful in some way. However, we do not name individuals that are merely instrumentally valuable. An individual that is merely instrumentally valuable will have the same value as any other member of that kind and will therefore not be singled out as an individual with special significance. Our cars, tools, and kitchen appliances are instrumentally useful, but we do not tend to name them because we tend to regard them as replaceable. On the other hand, individuals that have sentimental worth are not replaceable. They may have the same instrumental value as another member of their kind, but they have more worth to us because we have attributed worth to them through our sentiments and thereby singled them out as individuals. For example, a teddy bear may be just as good as any other teddy bear in terms of functionality, but a child’s teddy bear is his or her teddy bear and as such is bestowed with worth.
So it seems that we only name individuals when they have intrinsic value (not attributed by us) or when they have sentimental value (attributed by us). It is important to note, however, that naming the individual does not add worth to the individual (for naming presupposes the worth). There is no internal change with respect to the individual so named. Instead, the naming constitutes an extrinsic change in relation to the community. As Jeshion states, naming “underscores or enhances the name’s referent’s significance for those that think of that individual through the name” (Jeshion 374). Similarly, Bean notices that in most cultures, “the bestowal ritual usually coincides with or constitutes the child’s acceptance as a member of his group, his recognition as a social person” (Bean 310). The giving of a name affirms that person’s value and place within the community. Consequently, our third condition is that an individual has a proper name only if (iii) the individual has intrinsic or sentimental value and has had that value affirmed by the community.
However, our conditions are not yet sufficient. We do not name all individuals that we believe and affirm to have intrinsic or sentimental value. Consider some of Jeshion’s own examples, which can be used against her position since she seems content with conditions like (i)-(iii). For instance, while it is true that we do not name most of our clothes even though we have a long term interest in their identity, Jeshion explains this by saying that we do not regard our clothes as significant individuals. However, there are items of clothing that are taken to be significant as individuals but are still not named (e.g., a wedding dress, a deceased relative’s jacket). Similarly, while some plants remain unnamed because we only regard them as instrumentally valuable (e.g., Jeshion’s tomato plants), other plants do have sentimental value and yet we still do not name them (e.g., an old oak tree on one’s property).
Animacy might be proposed as a fourth condition, but this fails. In a study using animals, the words associated with pet animals (e.g., dogs, cats) were taken to be proper names while those associated with non-pet animals (e.g., bees, snails, caterpillars) were not taken to be proper names, that is, until they were introduced as belonging to the experimenter (Jeshion 384). Jeshion rejects animacy on this basis. But this study does not show that animacy is not a necessary condition, for the children could have believed that animacy was simply not sufficient since the bees, snails, and caterpillars did not have any intrinsic or sentimental value. However, animacy is not a condition of naming individuals. For example, a pet rock is given sentimental value by its owner and who takes an interest in its identity over time. However, the rock has no animacy even though it is given a name.
What then is lacking in our conditions? I propose that those individuals we name have (or are treated as having) a personality. By personality, I mean that the individual may be taken to have (or may be artificially described as having) a certain character, intentional states, or unique personal qualities. This is similar to but importantly different from animacy, since animacy tends to imply that a being has personality, but the converse is not the case. Consider some evidence for this claim In child development research, “children exhibit a strong tendency to interpret a novel word as a proper name if it is applied to a person or person surrogate (a doll), but withhold the proper name interpretation for artifacts – blocks, shoes, toy cars and planes” (Jeshion 384). The person or person surrogate is regarded as having intentional states while the artifacts are not. However, when the artifacts are treated as having personalities, there is a different result. In another study, “children readily allowed the application of a proper name to foam geometrical objects so long as they were merely described in intentional terms – as having certain mental states” (Jeshion 384). Similarly, pet rocks are given faces and are described as though they had mental states, thus qualifying them as significant individuals deserving of names.
In a different study, Legerstee concludes that “[infants] recognize people as social stimuli (they vocalize, smile, alternate their gazes and imitate their actions) and objects as inanimate stimuli” (Legerstee 63). This can be combined with Katz’s observation that “within certain classes of objects (e.g., people), the children first discriminate individuals and then learn their names, whereas among other classes of objects (e.g., spoons) they do not discriminate individuals, and learn names only for the class” (Katz 469). Together, these studies suggest that names are properly ascribed to social entities, and social entities have personalities. As such, I conclude that an individual has a proper name only if (iv) the individual has (or is treated as having) a personality. Joined with the other three conditions, it seems that an individual has a proper name iff (i) a social community has bestowed that individual with a name and accepted that name as referring to that individual, (ii) there is a continued interest in the identity of the individual over time, (iii) the individual has intrinsic or sentimental value and has had that value affirmed by the community, and (iv) the individual has (or is treated as having) a personality.
Now consider some possible counterexamples. Yachts and racecars are often named, but we know that they do not have mental states even though their owners do have a long-term interest in their continued identity and their owners have sentimental feelings for them. Jeshion suggests in a footnote that we “anthropomorphize” both yachts and racecars due to a societal convention (Jeshion 379). Although Jeshion does not say, I believe that yachts and racecars are anthropomorphized because we attribute personality to them. We speak as though they had temperaments and wills; we talk to them as though they can hear us. Such anthropomorphizing explains why “adults may assign proper names to artifacts of some kind (e.g., boats, cars), [but] young children do not expect such objects to receive proper names” (Hall “Semantic” 1316). Adults have been exposed to societal conventions and have developed sentimental attachments for their yachts and cars whereas children have not. However, as one grows and is exposed to such conventions, one takes more and more entities to be “social.”
What about places? Cities, states, islands, parks, and even certain houses (e.g., large European estates) have proper names. We have a long term interest in them and we do regard them as having sentimental value as unique individuals. But do they have personality? Again, we often talk about them as though they had a personality or character by using terms that are intentional. Each place has a certain feel to it, a life of its own, or an atmosphere that distinguishes it from other places. Similarly, natural objects like mountains and trees are often described as having personalities and intentional thoughts. For example, a significant tree is said to have seen and heard much in its long life. A mountain is treated as having a will that is to be overcome by its climbers.
Perhaps these cases are a bit of a stretch for the fourth condition. However, this tension can be relieved by recognizing that while each condition is necessary, each need not be doing equal work. For example, there is a very great long-term interest in maintaining the identity of a mountain that is shared by many people. This can counteract the deficiency in sentimental value or lack of personality that the mountain has. Similarly, a named tree may have great sentimental value but lack a lot of distinguishing character. Nevertheless, it seems to me that these four conditions (or something very much like them), are necessary and sufficient for an individual’s having a name.
Finally, consider a few implications. If having a name signifies social bestowal and acceptance, a long-term interest in one’s identity, intrinsic or sentimental value, and a personality, then denying that an individual has a name (or refusing to give or to use a name) is (or can be taken as) a denial that the individual meets one of these conditions. Jeshion points out that when we fail to name a pet animal, this is “normally interpreted as regarding the animal as insignificant, or replaceable, or otherwise somehow valued only as an instance of its kind, not, in the first instance, as an individual” (Jeshion 379). She also gives the example of dog breeders that discourage their children from naming the puppies that will be sold to prevent sentimental attachments. Similarly with chickens and cows that will be eaten. It is better to not name them and in so doing deny that they have any intrinsic value and to prevent sentimental value from forming.
Mary Phillips notices that laboratory animals are rarely given proper names. The dog or cat in the lab is regarded as “ontologically different” from the pets at home (Phillips 119). There is a long term interest in the continuing identity of the lab animal because the experiment involving it is done over a long period of time. However, the interest in the animal is related only to its instrumental worth in performing the experiment. Compare this to animals in the pound or in pet shelters. Even without owners, they are immediately treated with affection and are thus given temporary names to emphasize their individuality and significance.
Consider also the example of stillborn babies. In some cases, the baby is named “as a way of dignifying and underscoring importance” (Jeshion 379). However, other couples refrain from naming their stillborn baby. This is done, “not because they’d not think or refer to the baby. It has rather to do with somehow not enhancing its individuality to them or shielding themselves from the psychological effects of thinking of the baby by name” (Jeshion 379). The couple is attempting to forestall any sentimental value. By refusing to name, one prevents oneself from becoming attached to the individual because one denies its significance as an individual. This explains why using a demonstrative or description to refer to an individual that has a name is taken to be insulting. By not using the name that that individual was given, one is refusing to acknowledge their significance as an individual and (implicitly) denying that they have intrinsic or sentimental worth, that they are worthy of long-term interest, or that they have a personality.
In conclusion, this paper has shown that a proper name is much more than a device used to facilitate communication. Instead, a proper name is used to pick out a unique individual because of that individual’s worth, personality, and long-term interest in a social community. One might say, as the Saami people do, that by acquiring a proper name a particular individual moves from merely “being labeled” to “being” (Anderson 186). While common names merely label individuals, proper names recognize an individual’s individuality. Thus, we should conclude that a proper name, while often semantically useful, primarily marks and underscores an individual’s significance and that is why it is used.
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